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UST AS ARMIES PLAN FOR THE NEXT WAR by learning the lessons of
the last, so nongovernmental organizations (NOOs) in looking towards
the future base themselves on the problems and dilemmas of the recent past. If
the number of
training sessions and conferences are anything to go by,
NOOs think they have a variety of problems.! The last decade of the twentieth
century is confronting them with unexpected challenges in situations of
conflict. It is not that the NOOs are unfamiliar with conflict; something about
recent conflicts has changed, with particular impact on NOOs.
Some of that change may simply be the prevalence, to a greater degree than
in the past, of elements previously present. One such example is the attempt of
the fighting parties to control the delivery of humanitarian assistance. This
may be accompanied by novel, or apparently novel, forms of fighting. If an
object of the fighting requires the direct and indirect targeting of the civilian
population, this is likely to have an impact on NOO activities. If, for example,
an object of the fighting is to bring about the removal of a portion of the
population from an area (e.g., "ethnic cleansing"), the conduct of hostilities is
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likely to take a different form from that of conflicts that are in effect a "simple"
power struggle. In both cases, there may be displacement of the civilian
population, but the manner in which that happens, the length of the resultant
displacement, and the prospects for ultimate return, will be very different.
Another key change in the past decade with a significant impact on NOO
operations is the likelihood that UN or
military personnel,
or
mandate, will be
acting under a
2
found in the theater of conflict.
These developments have an impact not only on NOOs but also on
organizations (lOOs), such as the United .Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The fact that both NOOs and 100s are
adjusting to changes, possibly in different ways, simply adds to the complexity
of the situation. NOOs are more used to working alongside 100s than with the
military, but the 100s are subject to different pressures in adjusting to change
than are the NOOs. It can be as difficult to adapt existing relationships as to
forge new ones. That process of adaptation is made more complicated when an
100 is given the role of
NOO activities.3
Once NOOs recognize the need at least to reconsider existing practices, they
are likely to encounter further difficulties. There may be a natural tendency to
assume that existing practices based on experience are right for the particular
NOO; challenges to assumptions, which appear to be truths to those making
them, are painful. Each NOO has its own "mandate" or objective. Other
organizations with different objectives may need to change, but they are the
experts on their own areas of activity; in that field, the particular NOO has
nothing to learn from others. Where, on the other hand, it is recognized that
there may be something to learn from the experience and solutions of other
NOOs, the question becomes, how relevant is the experience of others? To
what extent can one NOO learn from the experience of others? At least by
meeting together and sharing what each perceives to be its difficulties, there is
the opportunity for individual NOOs to reflect on their own assumptions and
practices.
This only serves to emphasize one of the clearest lessons of the past decade:
NOOs cannot be lumped together. Their aims are different and their working
methods are dissimilar. This means that in the same situation different NOOs
will react differently. Both UN and
forces and the parties to a
conflict must avoid the assumption that all NOOs will react in the same way.
Seen from outside, NOOs have more in common with one another than they do
with 100s or other groups present in theater. Se!!n from within an NOO,
however, the view may be otherwise. The goals, working methods, and
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previous experience of a particular NGO may make it easy for it to work with
UNHCR, whereas another NGO may have problems with some of UNHCR's
working methods. 4
This paper will first examine the diversity of NGOs that may be found in
conflict situations. There is no attempt to be comprehensive, an attempt that
would be doomed to failure. The object rather is to illustrate the diversity. The
variety of conflict situations in which NGOs may find themselves will then be
considered briefly. There is an interplay between the type of NGO and the
varieties of conflict situations which is likely to affect the NGOs' priorities and
their perceptions of the problems. There will then be an examination of certain
commonly recurring themes. Again, there is no claim to be comprehensive in
either the identification of the themes or their treatment. The themes in
question are humanitarian assistance, medical activities, neutrality, the
reporting of violations of applicable legal norms, and the accountability of
NGOs, including the role of the media. The paper will conclude with a highly
speculative and personal view oflikely trends in the short to medium term.
The Diversity of NGOs
Any attempt to classify NGOs must be accompanied by two notes of
caution.5 First, classification is a tool of convenience, not a straitjacket.
Second, an NGO may fall into more than one of the categories.6 It must also be
remembered, when considering NGOs in situations of conflict, that many of the
NGOs present may not be conflict,specific because they were already working
in a State when the fighting broke out'? That can include both local and
out,of,country NGOs. This situation is likely to be particularly true of the first
category.

Development NGOs. Development NGOs often have long,term projects in a
country. Their activities usually fall into the field of economic and social rights.
They are involved in the development of the local infrastructure for the
provision of essential needs. They may be group specific (e.g., women and
or resource or issue specific (e.g., water or appropriate
technologies9). They may work throughout one or more States or just within a
certain distinct region(s). As the view of such assistance has changed in the
\Vest from "charity" to development assistance, much greater attention has
been paid to capacity building within the recipient community and to
encouraging the participation of those whom the project is designed to assist. 1o
This involves listening as well as doing. Sustainability is more important than

235

NGOs in Situations of Conflict
speed. Many NOOs in this group will be used to working with or through
governmental infrastructures, which may have the effect of helping to
strengthen them. ll In building up local capacity, the NOOs are seeking to avoid
creating dependency.
Since their work is not conflict related, there are no "sides," simply people in
need of assistance. The question of neutrality and impartial assistance to all
sides does not arise. This enables development NOOs to confine their activities
to one area within the State, even if the same need exists elsewhere. 12 For this
group doing something somewhere is better than doing nothing at all.

Relief NGOs. Relief NOOs are specialists in disaster assistance, whether the
disaster is man,made or natural. They have no long,term commitment to a
particular people or place, but rather seek to meet acute needs during periods of
crisis. The issue of capacity building, or even infrastructure building, is not
generally applicable. Involving the recipient community is much less important
for reliefNOOs, but they have been affected by the debates within development
NOOs and may make token gestures in this direction. There is a danger that
they may ignore the impact of relief on the local economyY This may have a
negative impact on long' term capacity,building, including the capacity for
crisis management. The impact of relief can also be positive, as where the
volume of relief available destroys a black,market. 14 The reliefNOOs need to be
experts in logistics and able to function autonomously. They cannot rely on
finding an infrastructure in place, whether that be roads or governmental
institutions.
Some relief NOOs have built up a wealth of experience in a variety of
theaters of conflict. They are aware of the need to negotiate with parties in
control on the ground and realize the dangers in such negotiations. They are
used to debates about their "neutrality" and of the need to be, and to appear to
be, impartial.
Other NOOs operate in a different way. Some are not NOOs in the
traditional sense. Groups of individuals, troubled by a particular conflict, might
put together a truck load of the relief they assume to be necessary. They may
even manage to send a small convoy of trucks to the conflict zone, with a view
to distributing the relief. Such individuals have enthusiasm and commitment
but a total lack of experience. IS They have no knowledge of what is needed
where. They have no experience of negotiating relief through zones of conflict.
They may fail to recognize signals of personal danger. A problem arises when,
unwittingly, their activities prejudice better organized and more significant (in
terms of volume) relief efforts. The individuals involved should be encouraged
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to put their efforts into fund,raising for experienced reliefNGOs. The difficulty
is that established NGOs can hardly make such an argument; it appears to be
born of rivalry or a fear of competition. Others must assume the responsibility
for making the argument.
If the group just discussed may be seen as exasperatingly naive amateurs, a
much more serious problem is caused by relief "cowboys." Certain NGOs want
to be seen as getting through to the places others cannot reach, whatever the
price. The price paid, in terms, for example, of diverted relief supplies, will not
be seen on television screens, but their presence will be. They are very
dependent on donor support and therefore need to have a high profile presence
in the areas of acute need, where the television cameras are most likely to be.
Not only do such groups cause problems in theater, where the conflicting
parties may assume that they can exact the same price from all relief agencies or
that all such NGOs will behave in the same way, but more traditional relief
NGOs may find themselves in competition with them for donor support. If the
latter are seen to be doing something, they may attract greater financial support
from individuals than more responsible, lower profile NGOs. This, in tum, may
affect the conduct of the well,established NGOs. In order to maintain donor
support, they may be tempted to ignore certain well, established principles of
their modus operandi. 16 There is little that can be done to regulate the
"cowboys." The well, established reliefNGOs can, however, reinforce their own
adherence to certain principles. They can agree with one another to make joint
appeals in emergency situations and to distribute the resultant "kitty"
according to an agreed formula. 17 This avoids competitive fund,raising. Under
the leadership of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), a code
of principles has been agreed upon for the delivery of humanitarian
assistance. IS It is to be hoped that governments, which are often, directly or
indirectly, very significant donors to relief operations, will make their funding
conditional upon adherence to these principles. 19

Medical NGOs. Development and relief NGOs may, of course, work in the
medical field. In addition, however, there are dedicated medical NGOs which
offer medical treatment in situations of conflict. What might be termed
"medical/development assistance" includes group specific activity, such as that
related to the promotion of women's health,z° and action related to a specific
medical field. 21 The work may be part of a larger development program or may
be the only activity of the organization. Certain medical concerns, notably
female reproductive health, need to be handled with even greater cultural
sensitivity than general development issues. Where the medical activity
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involves dealings with patients and is handled by medical personnel, issues of
medical ethics may arise, particularly with regard to confidentiality.22
The provision of medical services in situations of conflict is particularly the
province of the ICRC and Medecins sans Frontieres (MSF). This is what
distinguishes such organizations from relief agencies that include medical
goods in their consignments. The ICRC and MSF send medical teams into the
field, including specialists in war surgery.23 The two organizations are keenly
aware of what distinguishes them from one another. 24 From the outside, it is
clear that they have very different ground rules with regard to where they will
go and under what conditions. When it comes to the treatment of patients,
both sets of medical personnel are bound by and apply the rules of medical
ethics. 25 They are marked out from other relief organizations not only on
account of their adherence to a particular code of ethics; situations in which
they have to work often require them to apply the principle of "triage" in
assigning priority of treatment. In this, they have much in common with the
medical services of armed forces. 26 They are not, however, subject to the
constraints of a military hierarchy or military discipline.
Movement NGOs. There are many NGOs working with refugees and asylum
seekers, but this tends to be in the country of refuge, rather than in the place
from which they are fleeing. Development and relief NGOs may work with
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), but they do not generally
focus on the cause of displacement; rather, these NGOs deal with current
needs. Human rights NGOs may address the causes of refugee displacement,
but in the context of human rights violations rather than the resultant
displacement. UNHCR is, of course, an agency concerned with the causes and
effects of displacement. If there are NGOs that focus specifically on
displacement (such as I.O.M.), they are not as well known as the most
prominent development, relief, medical or human rights NGOs.
Human Rights NGOs. The majority, and certainly the best known, of the
human rights NGOs work principally in the field of civil and political rights.
There are, nevertheless, certain NGOs that work outside the area of conflict on
what might be seen as survival rights or economic and social rights, such as
those to food and shelter.27 In addition, certain development NGOs articulate
at least some of their activities in human rights language. 28 What the human
rights NGOs have in common is that they do not deliver assistance or services
in the field in the same way as the organizations so far discussed. This does not
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mean that they do not have a field presence; their function is, however, very
different.
Insofar as human rights violations are a significant cause, or symptom, of
impending conflict, timely and effective response to the concerns articulated in
the reports of NGOs would represent a form of conflict prevention. Yet it
happens all too rarely.
The principal tool of human rights NGOs is the report. Such reports aim to
attract publicity in order to secure the "mobilization of shame." Human rights
NGOs vary significantly in the use they make of their reports for lobbying. Many
are not membership organizations, although they may have subscribers. Amnesty
International is unusual in being not only a membership organization but one
which relies heavily on the campaigning activities of members. This includes
putting pressure not only on their own governments with regard to the situation
in another country but also on the offending government by letter writing to a
wide range of public officials. Many of the human rights NGOs make effective use
of the UN human rights machinery by, for example, submitting information to
UN thematic and Special Rapporteurs and to the Human Rights Committee
established under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 29
The human rights NGOs once showed a certain initial reluctance to get
involved in legal questions arising out of the conduct of hostilities. They often
found themselves reporting on violations of human rights that occurred in
situations of
conflict, particularly in central America, but
tended to concentrate on the impact on civilians. Since human rights law
directly binds only State authorities, they tended to focus on human rights
violations carried out by police and armed forces.3o This exposed them to the
charge of
since they did not address "violations" by
entities.
The pattern with regard to human rights reporting, however, has changed
markedly over the past decade. Human Rights Watch led the way in analyzing
situations and particular actions from the standpoint of humanitarian law as
well as human rights law. This enabled them to examine the conduct of
military operations.31 Amnesty International has, more cautiously, begun to
follow suit.32 This is partly the product of a change in the pattern of human
rights violations. While individual cases of arbitrary detention, torture, and
unfair trials continue to exist, situations of gross and systematic violations of
human rights have acquired greater prominence through conflicts such as
those in Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.
The human rights NGOs also now seek to address "violations" perpetrated
by
entities. The language used and the campaigning tools
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are different, but these base themselves on the same standards as those
applicable to States.
Human rights NGOs need reliable sources of detailed information. One of
the obvious potential sources in situations of conflict is the personnel attached
to development, relief, and medical NGOs. This has given rise to real dilemmas
for the latter, who fear that their neutrality and impartiality may be called into
question if they provide information on violations of human rights or
humanitarian law, however objective and impartial the reporting. This may
prejudice their ability to continue providing relief to those in need. (This
problem will be considered further below.)
It has been seen that a wide variety ofNGO actors may be found in situations
of conflict, with very different functions and views as to the principles
applicable to their activities. A further, extremely Significant, variable is the
type of situation in which they find themselves operating.

The Diversity of Situations
Before the Fighting. Many, but not all, recent conflicts have arisen in States
receiving some form of development assistance. In some cases, the assistance
has taken a traditional form, that is to say, the development of infrastructures
to meet the basic needs of the population. In more recent years, direct or
assistance has sometimes come with strings
indirect
attached. (Conditionality will be examined further below.) In the case of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, assistance has taken the form of
help in adjustment, rather than development. What has been sought, notably
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSeE), has been
the promotion of the institutions and mechanisms of civil sOciety.
In many cases, conflict is the direct or indirect result of weak State
structures.33 Where chronic instability has prevented effective
governmental structures are weak, and the outbreak or intensification of
fighting presents a challenge that overwhelms them. In other cases, the
precipitating element may be the aftershocks brought about by the implosion of
the former Soviet Union. Where the conflict is a reaction to an autocratic
regime, it may be the indirect result of weak State structures, however
paradoxical that may appear. Nervous governments faced with challenges to
their authority do not have the confidence to allow space for dissent or to
negotiate the challenge; instead, they respond with oppression, thereby
contributing to that which they most fear.
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The development NGOs are not well placed to address these concerns,
beyond attempting to meet survival needs and, through cooperation with
government agencies, seeking to instill good practice. They are, however, well
placed to observe and to send warnings to the international community.
Development agencies sent the clearest possible signals about the deteriorating
situation in Somalia, but to no avai1.34 From outside the countries involved,
human rights NGOs may send similar warnings. That happened most notably in
the case of Rwanda.

During the Fighting. The fighting may make it impossible to continue with
development assistance, either on account of the hostilities or of the resultant
dislocation, such as the displacement of the population. There will suddenly be
a change in the political and legal context, and a plethora of new players in the
field. It is all too easy, in an academic or bureaucratic ivory tower, to forget the
chaos engendered by an ever,changing political and military situation, about
which there is usually inadequate and/or outdated information, and by the
constant need to achieve new means of cooperation with ever, changing
organizations. It is little wonder ifNGOs simply react to events.
NGOs with the most experience in conflict situations are likely to be those
which have developed nwdi operandi to cope with predictable chaos. The
difficulty, however, is that while chaos is predictable, its particular form is not.
Emergency reliefNGOs will not have the experience of the particular society
and culture that development NGOs will have gained.
The apparently rigid principles of the IeRe may give the impression that
they can cope with high levels of chaos and rapid change.35 They simply follow
their tried and tested principles. The danger, however, is that the principles
become a straitjacket that prevent the IeRe from adapting to changing
circumstances.36 At least as great a problem is presented by NGOs that have not
thought through in sufficient detail their principles of action and cooperation.
They may be tossed around by circumstances, consoling themselves with their
bottom line: "do no harm.,,37
It would be presumptuous to propose solutions either to the IeRe or to less
experienced NGOs. They can only be urged to take the time to debrief their
personnel and attempt to identify, and then learn, the lessons to be learned.
Even as they do so, they should avoid reassuring but illusory certainties; just as
every NGO is different, so is every conflict.
The same problems will also beset any UN or UN,authorized forces in the
field. They need to avoid the dangerous tendency of lumping all NGOs
together. This might best be avoided if they got to know them individually. It is
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too late when they meet one another in theater. Getting to know and
understand the NOOs (and vice versa) needs to happen before deployment,
ideally through joint training exercises.38 This will not remove all causes of
conflict, but it may remove some and enable them to predict others. The same
is true of the relationships between NOOS.39 One of the lessons of recent
peacekeeping and
operations is that all parties in theater
need not only to know their enemies, but also their friends.

Towards the End of the Fighting. The fighting may come to a halt owing to
temporary or
or as a result of some form of
however fragile. There will inevitably be a need for assistance in
reconstruction. Even if there are still legacies of the fighting to be dealt with,
such as the disarming of fighters and the (re)creation of an effective and
accountable police force,40 the language of discourse will shift from
humanitarian law to human rights law, from relief to development. Since the
foundations for the
future will have been laid during the conflict,
it is as important that those laying the foundations understand what will come
next as it is that those involved in reconstruction understand the foundations
on which they are building. Human rights language is not the same as
humanitarian law language, even though both are premised on the inherent
dignity of the individual and the protection of the vulnerable. The two types of
analysis complement one another. 41 All the players, before, during and after
the conflict, need to be familiar with both.
The problems with which NOOs, and governments as major funders of their
operations, will have to grapple vary depending on the NOO and the situation.
Nevertheless, certain common themes do arise.

Humanitarian Assistance
In the constantly changing reality of the situation on the ground in Somalia,
the former Yugoslavia, Liberia, and Rwanda, any number of elements may
appear to have contributed to the result. That result may be a starving
populace, deprived of humanitarian assistance, or the massacre of refugees, or
"safe areas." It may be difficult to
the slaughter of innocents in
distinguish secondary elements from the irreducible kernel of hard choices.
That effort must be made by NOOs, 100s, and governments working together if
the dead of this decade are not to have died in vain.
All the conflicts have been marked, to a greater or lesser degree, by the
difficulty both NOOs and 100s experienced in getting humanitarian assistance
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to those who needed it. It is not surprising that the attention of NGOs has
turned to better coordination of relief efforts and to what must appear to be
deficiencies in the legal rules applicable. There is always a need to improve
coordination, but that is hardly an answer to denial of access to populations in
need. 42 Similarly, any examination of the legal rules applicable, whether in
international or non,international conflicts, suggests that the problem does
not lie there, although the failure to respect the rules is a problem.
In an international conflict, starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is
prohibitedY That does not extend to situations where starvation is the
foreseeable result but not itself the tactic. Relief operations that are
humanitarian and impartial in character should be undertaken, subject to the
agreement of the Parties concerned.44 The Parties are required to allow and
facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of relief, even if it is destined for the
civilian population of the adverse Party.45 The Parties have the right to
prescribe the technical arrangements, which include, but are not confined to,
the right to search relief convoys to confirm that they do not include military
equipment.46 Relief personnel are to be protected, but their participation is
subject to the approval of the Party in whose territory they will carry out their
duties. 47 While the language of the provision on humanitarian assistance is
mandatory, the requirement of consent is susceptible to abuse.
In non,international conflicts to which Protocol II of 1977 is applicable,
relief actions of an exclusively humanitarian character should be undertaken,
but subject to the consent of the High Contracting Party concerned.48 The
Protocol does not require the consent of the non,State forces because that
might appear to grant a certain status to the "rebels" and would be seen as
interference in the internal affairs of the State concerned. Starvation of
civilians as a method of combat is again prohibited.49
In non,international conflicts to which only common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 is applicable, there is no provision on the delivery
of humanitarian assistance. An impartial humanitarian body may, however,
offer its services to the Parties to the conflict, and that offer cannot be claimed
to constitute an interference in the internal affairs of the State.50
No doubt there are gaps, and the law could probably be improved, but that is
to miss the point. If the forces in control on the ground will not grant access to
populations in need, then either the assistance convoys run the real risk of
attack or they must be equipped to protect themselves. The consent of those in
de facto control is a practical prerequisite to the unarmed delivery of assistance.
Nor is the explanation plausible that the Parties are simply ignorant of the
rules, that if only they knew them, then they would allow access to the
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populations in need.51 The reasons for the denial of access may vary, but
improved dissemination of the rules is likely to have only a very limited effect.
The problem concerns not only access to populations in need, but also the
lack of security of those people, whether they be in Sarajevo, in refugee camps,
or in "safe areas."52 A BBC radio news bulletin carried an interview with an
inhabitant of Sarajevo during the siege of the city. He commented that the
international community seemed not to mind that he would die one day from a
sniper's bullet, provided he was not hungry at the time. Humanitarian
assistance was a substitute for an overall policy.
The NGOs have recognized the linkage between the delivery of
humanitarian assistance and the protection of the civilian population.53 It is far
from clear, however, that they have recognized that this may mean hard
choices. Governments may be less inclined to assist in the delivery of
humanitarian assistance if the price is high.54 For some NGOs, to save one life is
to save a universe. They would prefer not to have 90 percent of the aid diverted
to people in less need of it. They would prefer not to have to turn a blind eye to
the massacre of civilians. They are not prepared, however, to see one person
starve if that can be prevented.
NGOs are born of idealism and commitment to those in need. It is not
surprising that they should find it difficult to accept that the price of delivery of
assistance may be too high. One must also be cautious about the greater
willingness of governments, principal donors to NGOs, to contemplate such a
possibility, unless it forms part of a policy designed to promote the greater good
of the population. Determining that the price to be paid for delivery of
humanitarian assistance is too high cannot simply be allowed to be a means
whereby governments get themselves "off the hook."
Some NGOs see this attitude on the part of governments as an extension of
"conditionality" in the development assistance field. It is submitted that while
the two do have something in common, there is a difference in this context.
There are two priorities in relation to the population in need. One is their physical
security, the other the provision of humanitarian assistance. These priorities
may, in a given situation, compete with one another.
The protection of the civilian population may also raise the question of the
role of armed forces. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to deploy
armed forces that are appropriately configured and equipped, and that have the
mandate and, above all, political will to protect the civilian population. The
attempts to date by the international community, with the exception of the
"safe haven" in Northern Iraq immediately after its designation, have been
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and doomed to failure from the outset.55 It may be that this is a job
which should be done properly or not at all.
NGOs cannot afford to lose their impartiality, but that still leaves them with
hard choices.56 There may be a split between those that come to accept
restrictions on the delivery of humanitarian assistance in order better to
protect the civilian population, and those that cannot accept such restrictions.
If governments channel their funding to the former, the latter will be
dependent upon the support of individual donors. There may also be a split, not
necessarily along the same lines, between those prepared to work with UN or
forces and those that reject such cooperation on the grounds
that it prejudices their impartiality. By establishing clear doctrine for peace
support operations, including the tactical level, armed forces could contribute
significantly to reducing the perceived problem.57 It probably cannot, however,
be completely eliminated. While the question of the role of armed forces and
the debate between humanitarian assistance and protection overlap, they also
need to be considered separately. The latter presents a real challenge to NGOs,
whether or not the military are present.
Medical Assistance
The essential dilemmas faced by those NGOs providing medical services are
very similar to those in the field of humanitarian assistance generally,
compounded by questions of medical ethics. Impartiality becomes
individualized. The individual doctor is required to treat patients simply by
reference to medical need.58 This may be part of the explanation behind a
distinction in the operating practice of the IeRe and MSF. For the IeRe, the
provision of medical services is usually part of a larger operation. Its practice is
to insist on working on both sides of a conflict in order to protect its own
neutrality and impartiality. On the other hand, MSF, which similarly adheres to
impartiality, sees no conflict between principle and only working on one side,
or indeed in only one zone of one side, of the conflict. MSF medical personnel in
the exercise of their functions are impartial. They will treat by reference to
medical need alone, wherever they happen to be exercising those functions.
MSF and the IeRe can work alongside one another, but MSF is also to be found
where the IeRe does not or cannot gO.59
The two organizations also take very different positions in relation to
cooperation with human rights investigators and the two ad hoc war crimes
tribunals. Again, in the case of the IeRe this may be partly attributable to the
fact that it engages in a wider range of activity than the merely medical. There
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is clearly a possible question of the confidentiality of the
relationship.6O Giving information with consent, however, is clearly a different
question, and the two organizations take very different positions on it. (That
will be discussed further in the next section.)
There is one particular medical issue that concerns not only these two
organizations, but a wide range of other NGOs. It is best exemplified by the case
ofIrma Hadzimuratovic, a little girl who was seriously injured in Sarajevo in an
incident in which her mother was killed. 61 She needed very swift medical
intervention, which the medical personnel in Sarajevo were unable to provide
because of their inadequate resources. Irma was eventually evacuated, thanks
to the intervention of the British Prime Minister. It was, however, too late. Her
injuries were by that time much harder to treat than they would have been, and
she died some time later.
This raises some problems similar to the humanitarian assistance/protection
debate, compounded by the question of evacuation. Is the answer to improve
the quantity of medical relief if you are simply patching someone up to be
injured again later? Is it better to evacuate injured persons for medical
treatment if they then have to be returned to a war zone, than to do your best in
situ? Should children be evacuated, but only with their parents?62
There were and are, in fact, criteria for determining questions of medical
evacuation.63 Irma was regarded as not coming within them. It might be useful
if these were reexamined by, among others, the World Health Organization,
the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), medical and children's NGOs
and as wide a range of interested parties as possible. There may be no need for
change, but there does seem to be a need for at least a reconsideration of the
issue.
Neutrality, Impartiality and The Reporting of Violations of
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law

Reporting. Human rights NGOs carry out their function by gathering
information, analyzing it in terms of the applicable legal norms, and then
publishing the results. To effect change, they need publicity and campaigning.
While they would deny that they are other than impartial, their activities may
be seen to be, or be claimed to be, "political." Indigenous human rights NGOs,
where they exist, may be particularly vulnerable to suppression. International
human rights NGOs tend to work from outside the conflict zone, with only a
very limited field presence.
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Traditionally, relief agencies kept their distance from human rights NGOs,
for a variety of reasons.64 Particularly during the Cold War, human rights
activities were seen as "political." The relief agencies were also worried about
stepping outside their "mandate," and there was perhaps a concern about the
NGO equivalent of "mission creep." They also saw cooperation with human
rights NGOs as calling into question their independence and impartiality. They
were worried about the use that might be made of information supplied to
another organization and about the protection of witnesses. They were also
concerned that their own access to civilian populations would be jeopardized if
they were known to be supplying information to other organizations. Last, but
by no means least, they felt ignorant about human rights law, which seemed to
them a very different type of activity. They did not know on what to report.
There is no doubt that humanitarian agencies have a much larger field
presence than human rights NGOs. They also encounter, on a day,to,day basis,
the possible victims of violations of human rights law and humanitarian law.65
Humanitarian NGOs are the passive recipients of information and, in other
cases, are well placed to gather the relevant information more positively.
The situation in Rwanda seems to have marked a turning point. Oxfam was
the first agency to declare that what was happening was genocide, and it paid a
price for doing so. The attitude of NGOs who were blind and/or silent about
what was going on around them, provided they could deliver humanitarian
assistance, was heavily criticized in a paper by African Rights. 66
Rwanda precipitated a period of soul searching on the part of relief NGOs.
The first sign of a breakthrough was when a significant number of them
recognized that evaluating actions in the context of human rights norms did
not represent any loss ofimpartiality. That is to say that, while it may be done in
a one,sided way, such reporting is not inherently partial or one,sided. The
second breakthrough occurred when the relief agencies stopped to examine
their oft,repeated mantra-"neutrality, impartiality, and independence." The
ICRC principles dictate that its activities must be based on neutrality and
impartiality.67 Many reliefNGOs became very suspicious of neutrality, seeing it
as an excuse for remaining silent in the face of atrocities. If neutrality meant
never taking sides, they wanted to take the side of upholding universal legal
norms based on the rights of all individuals everywhere. They were on the side
of victims of violations, whoever they were. In other words, they would be
evenhanded in applying the same principles to everyone. This led them to
proclaim their impartiality and independence, but not their neutrality.68
While this evolution facilitated improved cooperation between reliefNGOs
and human rights NGOs, it did not, and could not hope to, remove all the
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problems. Some difficulties, such as the need to provide a minimum of human
rights law training to relief personnel in the field, can be addressed over time.
Others are more problematic. Whether being known to provide information to
human rights NGOs will result in a relief agency being ordered out of the
country or denied continued access to the population in need cannot be
answered in the abstract. The experience in that regard is not all negative.
Indeed, as noted at the Medecins sans Frontieres Conference in February 1996,
"the real risks to our operations and our ethics lie in silence. And there are
plenty of examples where human rights advocacy has in fact increased access to
the victims and improved the safety of our staff, as was the case in Burundi."69
The protection of witnesses is also a very real problem, as the experience of
those who have testified in Arusha, Tanzania, before the war crimes tribunal
and then returned to Rwanda has shown.
There may, nevertheless, be a shift in attitude. If the starting point of relief
NGOs is that they will gather information, in some cases seek it, and then pass it
on to responsible human rights NGOs (where they feel it to be safe to do so and
where they have the requisite guarantees as to the use to which the information
will be put), then the effectiveness of human rights reporting could be
transformed. Even if the relief agencies were only able to indicate likely
witnesses and sources of information, this would still be of considerable
assistance.
What is particularly striking is the leading role played by a medical NGO in
promoting the cooperation between relief agencies and human rights NGOs.
They might have been thought to have the biggest problem with the sharing of
information. Nevertheless, MSF has taken the lead and may have encouraged
other NGOs by its example. Of course, there is a separate question in relation to
the sharing of information. It is one thing to cooperate behind the scenes with
human rights NGOs. It is quite another thing to give evidence in criminal
proceedings before an international criminal tribunaUo

Giving Evidence. While the ICRC's policy is never to cooperate in this way,71
some intergovernmental agencies, such as UNHCR, have sought to strike a
balance between protecting their clients' confidentiality and giving evidence.
Other organizations and individuals, even within the same group, have taken
differing positionsY Again, MSF has been in the forefront of those promising
the greatest possible cooperation with the tribunals. In relation to the giving of
evidence at the request of the prosecutor, the rules of evidence give NGOs a
certain protection. 73 It remains to be seen what will happen when the defense
seeks to call an NGO employee as a witness and argues that the testimony is
248

Hampson
vital for a fair disposal of the case. If the judges agree and subpoena the
individual in question, a refusal to appear may result in contempt proceedings,
even, it would appear, in absentia.74 It is to be hoped that the judges will
recognize that in some cases there may be legitimate grounds for the refusal to
answer a question. That will be, and should be, determined by the judge and
not the NGO employee.

Advocacy and Campaigning. The twin issues of advocacy and campaigning
raise many of the same issues for NGOs as the reporting of violations of human
rights and humanitarian law. In some cases, the law on charities imposes
restrictions. 75 Some organizations have, nevertheless, become frustrated by
only treating symptoms and have begun to campaign about the causes of the
problems which they are there to address. Oxfam and Christian Aid, for
example, have campaigned regarding the causes of poverty and the cycles of
emergencies. Handicap International, a French,based NGO that provides
prostheses, became concerned about the extent of the need for artificial limbs
on account ofinjuries from anti,personnelland mines (APMs) and put pressure
on the French government to call for a conference to review the 1980
Conventional Weapons Convention.76 This resulted in the revision of Protocol
II of that Convention relating to the use ofland mines. 77 While the revised text
marked a considerable achievement, most notably by extending its application
to non,international conflicts, it fell far short of what NGOs perceived to be the
need-an outright ban on the use of APMs. (The Review Conference also
adopted a new fourth Protocol on blinding laser weapons.) 78 Subsequently, a
group of States, led by Canada, decided to negotiate a treaty banning the use of
APMs, which was signed in Ottawa by 120 States in December 1997.79
The campaign to ban the use, manufacture, and stockpiling of anti,
personnel land mines has been a quite remarkable achievement for NGOs.
Even five years ago, it was unthinkable that such a treaty ban could be
achieved. One may question the impact that the Ottawa treaty banning the
use of APMs will have, since the most important users and manufacturers of
APMs are not Parties to it, but this does not detract from the achievement of
the NGOs.80
This was not the work of one NGO or even of a linked group, such as medical
NGOS. 61 It represented a remarkable feat of organization to create a small
international committee, with a coordinating function, and national
organizations, consisting of a loose coalition ofNGOs. The arrangements had
to be both loose and flexible, to cope with the variety of mandates, objectives,
and campaigning methods of the different types of organizations involved.
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Participating groups included children's organizations, development NOOs,
refugee groups, relief organizations, human rights NOOs, and arms trade
groups. All these groups were able to find something which they were able to
contribute to the campaign.
The important question for the future is whether this is a precedent or a
phenomenon. Certain features of the APM issue made it an ideal
subject for a campaign. The scale of the problem was, and is, enormous. The
principal casualties are civilian. It was relatively easy to understand the
technology. The message was simple: what was sought was an outright ban on
use, in which case a ban on manufacture and stockpiling was logical. The
nature of the injuries and of the victims made a significant visual impact. One
only has to consider the campaign on laser weapons designed to blind, which
was running at the same time as the land mine campaign, to see how
significant such features are. There were essentially only two organizations
campaigning about laser weapons, the ICRC and the Arms Project of Human
Rights Watch.82 Those lobbying understood the technology and the issues,
but there was never the mobilization of public opinion that occurred in
relation to APMs.
The key question then becomes whether there are other weapons that might
provoke the same reaction in the public as land mines. Concern has been
expressed about the use of small caliber ammunition and cluster weapons, but
it seems questionable whether they would lead to a mass campaign.B3 It is more
likely to be the specialist NOOs that become involved. If a conflict were to
occur with a widespread use of incendiary weapons, that issue might become
the focus for a campaign but there is no sign of that at present. There may now
be a generally higher level of awareness and concern about the environmental
impact of spent munitions and the insecurity which both causes, and is the
product of, high levels of expenditure on conventional weapons, but it seems
unlikely that that awareness will become sufficiently focused to produce a
campaign as effective as that to ban land mines.
At present, it would seem that the land mine campaign is likely to be unique,
at least in its scale of public mobilization and the range of participating NOOs.
Nevertheless,. there are NOOs well placed to campaign about the use of other
weapons, and a precedent now exists for a wide range of NOOs to work
together. The first group will continue to be involved in campaigns about
specific weapons. It is not possible to predict whether one of those weapons will
seize the imagination of the public. It takes an unusual combination of factors
to do so.
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The Accountablity of NGOs
Accountability is not, in this context, confined to legal accountability,
although it goes without saying that NGOs are subject to the laws of the places
in which they work. It includes moral responsibility, particularly where third
parties treat NGOs as having some such responsibility for their actions. It also
includes accountability in the sense of cause and effect. Where a person or
body responds to the activities of an NGO in a way that affects the ability of the
NGO to continue with those activities, this might be seen as de facto or effective
accountability, irrespective of whether it is "justified" or even reasonable. The
NGO has to take into account the possibility of such a reaction when
.
determining its course of action.
In a more restricted sense, accountability usually involves the attainment of
goals. A person or body evaluates the performance of the NGO by reference to
objective criteria. This requires both measurable goals and objective criteria of
evaluation. \Vhen the beneficiaries of action are people, there are the usual
difficulties in determining whether there should be a qualitative, and not
merely quantitative, evaluation and, if so, how to set about it. Is it necessarily
the case that NOO One is "better" because it delivers 1,200 tons of relief in the
same time and/or for the same cost that NOO Two delivers thousand tons? Is
it necessary to consider the accountability ofNGOs to recipients/beneficiaries
and also to donors, both individuals and States? Consideration also needs to be
given to the relationship between accountability and the role of the media.

a

Accountability to RecipientslBeneficiaries. Development NGOs have had, for
quite some time, a sense of responsibility toward the people whom they are
trying to help.B4 There has been a shift over the past forty or so years from the
sense that the recipients are the beneficiaries of charity to a perception that the
NGOs are working in collaboration with the local community. This has been
articulated through such concepts as empowerment and participation, a,nd has
led to greater reflection about the impact of assistance within the community.
These ideas began naturally to "leak" from development to relief operations. .
There is a different paradigm in the case of activities relating to violations of
human rights or humanitarian law. Human rights NGOs and the ICRC have
been acutely aware of the potential risk to individuals, rather than the
community, in publicizing names. It may be, but this is speculation, that the
preoccupation of development/relief NGOs with communities rather than
individuals contributed to their silence in the face of human rights violations.
The recent recognition by reliefNGOs that assistance cannot be divorced from
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protection suggests that their position is evolving. It may be that their focus on
communities means that they \"ill only become engaged in protection activities
where the violations are widespread and systematic. Provided they recognize
that unpunished individual violations may become a practice, it may be
necessary, in order to achieve a sensible distribution of roles, for reliefNGOs to
become involved in action only in the case of widespread violations. Human
rights NGOs are probably better suited to dealing with individual cases. In that
situation, relief agencies could help by passing on information.
It may be significant that MSF, a medical organization, is at the forefront of
moves to get relief NGOs to consider the issue of protection. While medical
activities might seem to be a type of relief action, they do involve the
relationship between an individual patient and medical personnel. In other
words, medical NGOs do not function only at the community level.
Ultimately, it does seem that all NGOs have a sense of responsibility toward
recipients/beneficiaries. However, the form it takes differs, depending on the
type of activity involved.

Accountability to Donors. It is necessary to draw a distinction between
accountability to individual donors and to State or organizational donors, not
least because the two constituencies may impose competing, if not conflicting,
demands. In addition, organizations and States are more likely to require
accountability in the most literal sense. The administration and control
involved may deter some NGOs from even seeking such funding. Two different
ideas may become confused in the minds of NGOs. One is accountability,
which is some type of obligation to another person or body. The other is the
desire ofNGOs to carry out their activities in as many of the places where they
are needed as possible. This requires money. It would be understandable if they
sought to tailor their activities to what is most likely to appeal to their donor
constituencies. This is not the same thing as an obligation of accountability to
donors, even if it is articulated in those terms.
Individual donations may be closely linked to media coverage of the
epicenter of a crisis. In that case, the NGO has to be seen to be there. On the
other hand, State or organizational funding may have strings attached, either
conditionality or something that looks like it. The NGO then has to determine
whether it is simply interested in raising as much money as possible, or whether
it has a view as to the maximum possible funding from one particular source
which is consistent with its independence. For some this may mean a refusal to
accept any governmental funding. That is more likely to be the case for human
rights NGOs than for relief/development NGOs.
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The need to maintain donor support and/or accountability to donors may
have a direct impact on the activities undertaken. In particular, it may prompt
an NGO to be involved in a highly visible relief program, irrespective of the
price paid in terms of the diversion of relief or silence in the face of serious
violations of the law.

Accountability and the Media. To consider generally the role of the media in
conflict situations is beyond the scope of this paper.85 Some commentators
appear to assume that there is a "CNN factor," while others dispute that it has
the significance often ascribed to it.86 Some journalists think their role is to be
objective and detached, whereas others aspire to what Martin Bell has
described as "the journalism of attachment." That does not mean biased
reporting: it means identifying with and conveying the plight of victims and
daring to express anger and outrage.
As seen above, donor support may be affected by the coverage of an NOO's
activities. That may, in turn, put pressure on the NOO to be not where there is
most need or the greatest possibility of effective action, but where the cameras
are. In some cases, NGOs can determine where the cameras go. The NGOs may
be a principal source of information for the news media and also a source of
relatively secure transport.
NGOs are generally aware of their need for media coverage and, over the
years, have spent effort and resources in developing professional media
strategies. It is less clear whether they are aware of possible dangers in their
ambiguous two,way relationship with the media. In seeking to use the media to
their own advantage, they may also be, deliberately or inadvertently,
manipulated. It may be necessary to distinguish between the print media and
television. \Vhen reference is made to the "CNN factor," it is only the latter
which is being considered.
The question in this context is the extent to which NOOs are accountable
for, first, the impact of media coverage where they make the coverage possible
or are the subject of the coverage and, second, the effect of that coverage on
their own operations. At the very least, this is a question that responsible NGOs
should be asking themselves.

The Future
Speculation is an inherently hazardous activity. It is not possible simply to
examine where NGOs are now and to project that forward. There are many
other variables, all of which will interact with one another, and which need to
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be taken into account. First, there are possible changes in the causes and forms
of conflict. Second, there is uncertainty as to the likely international response.
The international community may decide that acute crises are too difficult to
handle and must simply be contained until they burn out, or else it may
discover the will to seek real solutions. Third, 100s may adjust their priorities
and modi operandi in various ways.
It is possible, on the basis of recent experience, to draw up a nightmare
scenario. In it, parties to a conflict seek an unlawful goal and consequently
engage in systematic violations of humanitarian law. The only concern of
NOOs is to ensure that people are fed. They turn a blind eye to the fact that
many victims will be dead in a few hours or a few days. Armed forces external to
the parties to the conflict are helpless, either owing to inadequate numbers and
equipment and an inappropriate mandate or else a fear of casualties, which
means that they only move in such large numbers as to be incapable of
influencing the situation on the ground. States, in the meantime, use assistance
as a substitute for policy and as an excuse for closing frontiers to prevent mass
movement of people. Some of these elements have been present in many
recent conflict situations. If they are not to recur, lessons must be learned.
There is evidence that at least some NOOs are biting the very painful bullet.
They have at least recognized that assistance needs to take account of the need
for protection. There is not much value in "better fed than dead" if the
recipients are going to be killed later. Some NOOs know they have to strike a
difficult balance; discovering appropriate ways of doing so will not be easy. The
lCRC, in some ways, exemplifies the dilemma. It has a wealth of experience and
is used to relying on its demonstrable neutrality and impartiality. At the same
time, this "guardian of humanitarian law" refuses to allow its delegates to give
evidence before war crimes tribunals. There will be a certain degree of trial and
error as NGOs seek a way forward, and no two situations are the same. Some of
the NGOs are, nevertheless, looking for practical solutions.87 It seems likely
that there will be a split in the NGO community. Some will insist on delivering
assistance, whatever the price. This group will include not only "cowboys," but
those who see themselves as idealists. Others will, with reluctance, see how the
wind is blOwing, in particular with respect to State and organizational donors,
and go along with it. Still others will be convinced of the need for adjustment,
seeing it as providing more net help.
In this situation, it is not the responsibility of only the NGOs to adapt and
change. States, particularly members of the Security Council, have a huge
responsibility. They have so far proved incapable of responding to an
impending crisis, even where the NGOs and the UN machinery have made it
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clear what is at stake. Nor have States so far shown a willingness to bite their
respective bullets. It is possible that the greatest single contribution that could
be made to protecting victims from atrocities would be by breaking the cycle of
impunity everywhere. The law of armed conflict is a useful tool because it is
based on the equality of belligerents (in other words is impartial) and is based
on individual criminal responsibility. To break the cycle of impunity requires
an effective international criminal court with an independent prosecutor.
States have to be willing to surrender their own soldiers to its jurisdiction. If
they create a tribunal with fairness and integrity, and if they train their soldiers
not to break the rules, they have nothing to fear from such a court. There is a
great deal to gain.
If those resorting to force know that they are likely to be tried if they
prosecute the conflict in unlawful ways, but will not be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court if they only target combatants and military objectives,
this might have a significant effect on their conduct. Not only would it
facilitate the task of NOOs in negotiating access for humanitarian assistance,
but the fighters would implicitly be recognizing the legitimacy of NOO
involvement in the promotion of the rule oflaw by providing protection. If the
belligerents recognize that there are unlawful ways of fighting, it cannot be a
sign of bias or lack of neutrality to seek to uphold the law.
Only States, acting diplomatically and where necessary through their armed
forces, can break the cycle of impunity. Only States can set effective controls
on the transfer of weapons. Only States can wield the sticks and carrots
appropriate to a particular situation. There is no shortage of rhetoric and hand
wringing. There is, to date, a lack of effective action.
The NOOs, armed forces, and donor States are going to have to surrender
long, cherished ideas if they are to reach an accommodation. They have
learned that they cannot simply insist on doing things in their own way,
without regard to others. They will have to recognize and adjust to the
priorities and needs of the other players. This does not mean that they have to
adopt them. The first step would be if they all spoke the same language. If they
used humanitarian law, human rights law, and refugee law as tools, they might
not say the same thing, but they would at least begin to understand one
another.
This is beginning to happen between armed forces and at least some NOOs,
and is most likely between those who have shared the experience on the
ground. Donor States are reexamining questions of humanitarian assistance,
but there is less evidence that they are assuming their particular responsibilities
in relation to conflict prevention and breaking the cycle of impunity.
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NGOs, armed forces, and donor States have recognized that they have the
same ultimate goal-the effective assistance and protection of victims. They
have also recognized that they need to search for ways forward, both separately
and together. There is still a long way to go before they convert these ideas into
practical solutions to the problems faced on the ground.
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